Situation, Facts and Events
03.04.2023

The reasons for the growth of the terrorist threat in Pakistan in 2023

Terrorist attacks in Pakistan peaked in 2013, averaging just under four attacks per day and killing about 2,700 people, Pakistani experts from Islamabad University state.

 

Recent trends suggest that 2023 could prove even worse, with nearly 200 terrorism-related incidents and at least 340 deaths by March.

 

The last quarter of 2022 seems to have set the tone for the months ahead, and December ended the year as the deadliest month for Pakistan's security forces in more than a decade. About 282 military and police personnel were among the 973 victims in 2022. 

 

There is a new terrorist triad at the core of this violence. It includes the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (IS-K), a regional branch of the Islamic State (IS).

 

One of the immediate explanation for the unprecedented surge in terrorism is the unilateral lifting of a year-long truce on November 28, 2022 by the TTP, who accused the government of “breaching of commitment” and criticized the Pakistani security forces for their actions in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, bordering Afghanistan.

 

The TPP is demanding the restoration of the special status of seven border regions, which was revoked in May 2018, and the release of dozens of its detained members. They also want the Pakistani army to leave the areas formerly closed for army deployment, presumably to establish its own Islamic caliphate. Islamabad dismissed these demands as “non-negotiable.” 

 

After the increased pressure since early 2021, the main TTP forces retreated to safe havens in Afghanistan, especially after the Afghan Taliban takeover in August 2021. The TTP leaders, including their head Nur Wali Mehsud, are currently enjoying refuge and hospitality in Afghanistan.

 

The presence of the top leadership of the TTP in Afghanistan and the freedom they enjoy has become a sore point in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban regime. Islamabad demands retaliatory action against TTP for violence in Pakistan. In a media interview, Mehsud denied that his group had used Afghan territory to attack targets outside of Afghanistan, but did not dispute that his fighters had orchestrated the series of attacks in Pakistan. Kabul appears to be reluctant to take direct and decisive action against the TPP for several reasons.

 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is home to a predominantly ethnic Pashtun tribe on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border, and due to that the TTP draws its strength from the tribal community in the region. The Afghan Taliban, also a predominantly Pashtun group, boasts an ethnic and ideological affinity for the TTP. They fought together against US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan during the two decades of the war on terror. Not surprisingly, as soon as Pakistan began hunting terrorists in the border regions, most of the TTP's senior leadership moved to safe havens in Afghanistan.

  Geopolitical factors may also contribute to the increase in terrorist attacks. Amid intense US-China rivalry, the Afghanistan-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and IS-K have publicly declared they will strike at Chinese interests within the region.

 

IS-K has markedly stepped up its anti-China propaganda campaign in recent months, publishing hundreds of posts that specifically focus on China and its regional interests.

 

Beijing believes that these groups are funded by the West and harm Chinese interests. They also view the murder of several Chinese citizens in Pakistan, almost all of whom worked to implement the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the flagship of the One Belt One Road initiative, in the same vein.

 

Beijing is also wondering why the US withdrew its designation of ETIM as a terrorist organization in November 2020 when Washington said there was no credible evidence that the movement continued to exist. 

 

The absence of coordinated civil and military action can also be a major contributing factor. This encourages the TTP to escalate its terrorist campaign, which Pakistani officials refer to as “proxy terrorism.”

 

Until early 2022, dozens of militants were eliminated as a result of ongoing military operations in unstable border areas. As a result, terrorist violence in Pakistan has dropped by 85%, according to expert and Pakistani military estimates.

  Critics attribute the resumed violence by IS-affiliated ethnic Pashtuns and Baluchis to the involvement of the Pakistani military in national politics. In a televised speech on November 27, 2022, just days before his resignation, former Army Chief of Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa acknowledged that the military had been interfering in politics despite a conscious decision in early 2021 to end “unconstitutional interference.” Even after his resignation, Bajwa admitted to “managing” Pakistani politicians, journalists and foreign affairs.

 

Even more critical than Bajwa's confession was the unprecedented political and economic turbulence that Pakistan has been experiencing for over a year now, with the looming public debt default. The removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in a controversial vote of no confidence in April 2022 plunged the country into political uncertainty. As Imran Khan accuses Bajwa of facilitating his removal, the military has never been as deeply engrossed in politics as was the case since March 2022.

 

Despite the public affirmation of “neutrality,” most Pakistanis hardly believe Imran Khan's statement which was accompanied by unprecedented political instability and an economic crisis. It has also affected the ongoing military campaign against terrorist organizations and seems to have encouraged the terrorists to increase their pressure, primarily on members of the Pakistani security forces. This trend suggests that Pakistan is likely to experience more violence during 2023.

Source: Институт Ближнего Востока