Is cooperation between the US and Taliban in the fight against terrorism feasible?
It does not happen often that the United States and the Taliban corroborate the authenticity of the same event, but on April 25, American officials appeared to confirm the Taliban's claim that the mastermind of the 2021 bombing that killed killing 13 US troops and 173 Afghan civilians was eliminated during the Taliban operation in the beginning of April. However, neither side named the terrorist, who turned out to be a militant of the regional division of the Islamic State terrorist organization, known as IS-Khorasan (IS-K).
Experts admit that Washington's recognition of the positive outcomes of the Taliban counterterrorism activities may indicate a certain rapprochement between the parties in terms of combating terrorism.
Former Afghan Lieutenant General Syed Sami Sadat commanded troops in the southern province of Helmand during the final months of the Taliban offensive. In August 2021, the day before the change of power in Kabul, he was appointed head of the Afghan National Special Operations Corps.
On April 26, Sadat claimed on social media that the orchestrator of the airport bombing, IS-K commander Abdullah Omar Bajavari, was still alive. In a subsequent interview with The Diplomat on May 12, Sadat insisted that Bajavari led the intelligence wing of IS-K and was operating fr om Kunar province. Bajavari was authorised by the leader of the group, Sanaullah, also known as Shahab al-Muhajir, a Kabul native, to plan the attack.
Sadat claimed that in April 2023 Taliban eliminated Dr. Hasan, a junior coordinator for IS-K operations in Herat, western Afghanistan. According to him, Hasan has nothing to do with the attack on the airport.
However, neither the claims of the Taliban's or the US, nor Sadat's contradictory claims can be checked to be true. Notably, a senior IS-K commander named Syed Omar Bajavari, also known as Khetab, was killed by Afghan National Police Special Forces during a counter-terrorism operation in the Achin region in April 2017. However, in extremist organizations around the world, the names and nicknames of terrorists are often the same, and there is no way to reliably know whether Abdullah Omar Bajavari and Syed Omar Bajavari are the same person.
Undenably, the IS-K still poses a serious threat to the Taliban and regional security. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the group has expanded its presence from its original stronghold in eastern Afghanistan to nearly whole all of the country's 34 provinces.
However, there are conflicting estimates of the size of the group, with numbers ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 fighters, while Sadat insists that their number is up to 7,000 people. The reason for the confusion is the refusal of the US and the Taliban to name the dead terrorist.
It is possible that this is has to do with the conlicting interests of both parties. Sadat insists that both the Taliban and the US are trying to sell a “success story”: the Taliban to the international community and the US to its people.
A leaked Pentagon assessment suggested that IS-K was once again using Afghanistan as a platform for plots against the US, Europe and Asia.
Sadat said the group now has an extensive support network in Kuzdar and Kharan districts in Balochistan, Pakistan, and its cells may have even infiltrated across the border into neighboring Iran.
If the pace of expansion of IS-K’s presence in the region continues, in the next two years the group may become much more dangerous and capable of organizing much larger attacks.
This can only be stopped with an effective counter-terrorism strategy implemented in Afghanistan. The Taliban do not have a sophisticated intelligence network to pursue IS-K, nor the ability or means to effectively fight the group.
Worse still, some low-level Taliban fighters may refuse to fight the group because of a symbiotic ideological link, which would seriously hinder counteracting it.
This is wh ere the prospect of US-Taliban counterterrorism cooperation against IS-K becomes important. This possibility has already been highlighted by the media.
At the same time, this prospect is a double-edged sword: while cooperation between Washington and the Taliban could contain IS-K, it also has the potential to legitimize the Islamic Emirate's regime and its oppressive worldview and policies. Over the past two years since the takeover, the position of the Taliban has become noticeably tougher. The danger of recognition of the movement without any material results on the ground could lead to new issues.