Based on materials by British experts 

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, or JNIM) is a Salafi-jihadist group and the Sahel branch of the transnational organization al-Qaeda. The immediate parent organization of the militant group is the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose roots go back to the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. JNIM's genealogy goes back more than two decades to the founding of AQIM and its predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and their expansion into the Sahara and Sahel. Since then, the Sahelian insurgency has continued to evolve through splits, mergers, group formations and alliances, with JNIM emerging fr om the March 2017 merger of Ansar Eddine, the Sahrawi branch of AQIM, Al-Mourabitouna and Katiba Makina. Each of these groups shares a common ideology and strategic goals while exhibiting distinct profiles and characteristics in terms of composition, local interests and operational focus, which continue to influence JNIM’s activities to some extent. 

JNIM’s leadership system has a top-down hierarchy that includes three main levels: the central leadership, regional commanders, and local territorial commanders. Although its subgroups maintain distinct identities to some extent, JNIM builds a strong collective identity linked to its overarching brand and affinity with al-Qaeda. Since its inception, JNIM has evolved fr om a loosely organized coalition of local jihadist militant groups into a strategically coherent organization. JNIM’s organizational evolution is the result of structural reforms that have improved coordination and deepened cooperation among its component groups. Organizational cohesion is further solidified through internal oversight and a comprehensive chain of command, facilitated by the continued strategic deployment of senior military commanders to other JNIM subgroups and regions outside of these cadres’ original areas of operation. It has also developed a strategic plan that includes a combination of guerrilla warfare, the strategic use of violence, governance and population control, economic warfare, and media and propaganda operations. JNIM has sought to present itself as a “big tent” alliance, seeking to appeal to a broad cross-section of the local community and ethnic groups. Historically, JNIM has comprised multiple ethnic groups, including Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, Songhai, and Bambara communities, largely reflecting the social structure in the areas wh ere it was active. However, through its growing influence and geographic expansion, it has also extended its appeal to other ethnic groups, such as the Dogon in “Dogon Country” and the Seno-Gondo Plain, the Minyanka in the Sikasso region, and the Bissa, Djerma, Gourmanche, and Mossi in various parts of Burkina Faso and Niger. This inclusive approach allowed JNIM to present itself as a group that advocates for broad public support, allowing it to expand into ethnically and socio-politically diverse geographic regions obtaining an unprecedented reach in the region.

In addition to providing a detailed overview of JNIM’s structure, leadership, patterns of violence and area of operations, the British experts also highlight an under-researched aspect of economic warfare. This strategy has become an important aspect of JNIM’s overall strategy, which is a worrying development as JNIM remains one of the key armed actors in the Sahel conflict ecosystem. As such, JNIM is likely to continue to employ similar tactics and assert its influence while undermining the state on the battlefield and in the area of governance.

Activity and Areas of Operations 

 

JNIM is the most active armed participant in the regional conflict in the Sahel. Its influence and reach covers much of the Central Sahel and the coastal states of West Africa, extending fr om the group’s traditional strongholds in northern and central Mali to western and southern Mali, much of Burkina Faso, parts of Niger and the northernmost reaches of Benin, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. This started in central Mali in early 2015 with the emergence of Katiba Makina, which has since become the largest and most active JNIM subgroup, spanning several of JNIM’s most active military regions. In late 2016, Ansarullah Islam emerged in Burkina Faso and was subsequently absorbed into JNIM, which contributed to the group’s continued expansion in Burkina Faso, when it spread fr om the north of the country into southwest Niger and eastern Burkina Faso between 2017 and 2018. In the second half of 2018, JNIM further expanded its activities in southwest Burkina Faso. The group then focused on Côte d’Ivoire, wh ere it launched its first offensives in mid-2020, before moving on to Benin and Togo in late 2021. As a result of this multi-stage geographic expansion, JNIM’s power base and driving force have gradually shifted to central Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso. 

JNIM’s military efforts have focused on a wide range of adversaries, including international, regional, and local forces, as well as a variety of non-state armed groups, including pro-government militias and competing jihadist militants such as the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-Sahel). Typical for JNIM’s combat operations, the group’s activity has gradually increased in frequency, scale, and geographic reach as it has steadily expanded its military operations across the region. It has maintained a high operational tempo that outpaces its adversaries and competitors, as evidenced by JNIM’s involvement in nearly as much violent activity as all other key actors combined. JNIM is also distinguished by the fact that it wages a war on multiple fronts in the central Sahel, regularly and simultaneously engaging in armed clashes with a variety of the group’s declared enemies. JNIM has developed a diverse range of violent tactics as part of its warfare, using targeted assassinations, kidnappings, complex attacks, and large-scale military campaigns. One of the hallmarks of JNIM’s violent tactics is the use of remote violence, including using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, rockets, and mortar fire. Such events account for 16% of JNIM’s overall activity, a much higher rate than in the Sahel, wh ere such violence accounts for only 3% of total activity. JNIM also frequently uses explosives to destroy infrastructure, including military and security installations, government buildings, schools, telecommunications antennas, power lines and towers, and bridges. These tactics and capabilities have evolved and spread across the region as JNIM has expanded.

The group also employs a range of non-violent tactics to achieve its goals. These include various forms of resource provision and funding to support its activities, such as artisanal mining, livestock rustling, fundraising, “zakat” collection and extortion, looting and taxation of goods, and tapping into legal and illicit supply chains. JNIM also seeks to be a competitive governance actor, controlling the population and imposing its vision of an insurgent order. It regulates social behaviour by imposing dress codes, gender segregation, and other rules it believes are consistent with its interpretation of Islam in the areas it controls or influences. Although JNIM has relatively low bureaucratic capacity, it provides some basic services, notably justice, security, and dispute resolution, and manages access for non-governmental organisations.

 

Dynamics of a regional multi-front war

JNIM’s fighting has focused primarily on combating international and local government forces in the countries wh ere the group is active. It positions itself as a vanguard against foreign invaders and an alternative to local governments, which it describes as corrupt, secular, and anti-Islamic Western “puppet regimes.” For nearly a decade, French forces and the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) were the main enemies of JNIM, which the group’s media and propaganda frequently referred to as occupiers and invaders. Now that these missions are coming to an end — MINUSMA is scheduled to fully withdraw fr om Mali on 31 December 2023 — they have been replaced by mercenaries fr om the Wagner Group, which plays a similar role in JNIM propaganda. Wagner has reinforced the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and has contributed significantly to the expansion of military operations and the return of FAMa to areas fr om which it had previously withdrawn. However, the overall impact of Wagner’s activities may be minor, as JNIM has managed to maintain a high operational tempo in areas of central Mali wh ere the Malian army and Wagner have focused their joint efforts. JNIM has also steadily expanded its activities in the southern and western parts of the country, including around the capital, Bamako. This is not to say that JNIM has not been affected by FAMa and Wagner’s operations, including attacks on civilians in JNIM’s areas of operation, which have demonstrated both JNIM’s inability to protect the communities it claims to protect and its logic of avoiding direct confrontation. Instead, JNIM has resorted to the use of improvised explosive devices and landmines and has carried out suicide attacks against military bases and camps, including heliports and drone storages. It has also stepped up its attacks against the pro-government Dan Na Ambassagou and Dozo (or Donso) militias, which are JNIM's main non-state rivals in the Mopti and Segou regions, and communities associated with these militias in central Mali. 

In neighboring Burkina Faso, JNIM is believed to control or exert significant influence over large swaths of territory, with activity in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. JNIM is the most active armed actor in conflict with government forces and the state-backed Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) militias. The violent interplay between JNIM (and also IS Sahel), government forces, and the VDP has driven a significant escalation of conflict in Burkina Faso, making it the most militancy-affected country in West Africa as of mid-2023. Burkina Faso’s location and difficulty dealing with the JNIM threat have also made it a staging ground for JNIM activities in neighboring Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Togo.

 

 A major shift in JNIM’s violence is that the group initially engaged in selectively targeted military and security forces, communal leaders, and key collaborators of local and international forces. However, over time, JNIM has more frequently engaged in performative violence, as seen in successive suicide bombing campaigns in response to FAMa and Wagner operations. JNIM has also carried out increasing numbers of mass atrocities against communities it perceives as close to pro-government militias or IS Sahel. Mass violence by JNIM is especially pronounced in Burkina Faso, wh ere the group justifies it as a response to the state’s counter-mobilization and widespread abuses and atrocities by government forces and the VDP against the Fulani community.

 

At the same time, JNIM was engaged in conflict with IS Sahel — an additional layer of violent dynamics in the continuously transformed Sahel conflict. Former allies JNIM and IS Sahel are engaged in a deadly conflict that escalated into a full-blown inter-jihadist war in early 2020. Each of these groups targets communities it perceives as a supporter of the other, resulting in severe consequences for the civilian population. The protracted conflict between the two groups has further exposed JNIM weaknesses, especially in areas wh ere JNIM is relatively numerically inferior and does not exhibit the profile of a full-time fighting force, which IS Sahel has exploited strategically by prioritizing fighting JNIM rather than engaging in a broader multi-front war like JNIM. This has allowed IS Sahel to consolidate its control and influence in Mali’s Gao and Menaka regions, forcing JNIM’s northern regions of the Gourma, Gao, and Menaka to rely more heavily on their more battle-hardened fighters fr om central Mali and northern Burkina Faso. In response to the IS Sahel threat, JNIM has mobilized fighters en masse in the Mali-Burkina Faso borderlands to conduct large-scale offensives in the Gourma region. However, IS Sahel has demonstrated strategic skill by choosing its battles carefully and often retreating tactically when faced with an overwhelming fighting force. As a result, the conflict between the two groups has reached a stalemate. Neither side is in a position to strike a decisive blow, although both have managed to temporarily expand their operations into areas under the other’s influence.

 

State disruption and population control through economic warfare 

Aside from direct confrontation, economic warfare also serves as a key component of JNIM’s strategy to undermine its adversaries’ stability, weaken their resolve, and create opportunities for its expansion. JNIM employs economic warfare tactics across all the countries in which it operates. However, the intensity and spread of such activities have been notably pronounced in Burkina Faso. In the initial phase of asserting control, JNIM follows a blueprint that aims to eliminate symbols of state presence and undermine the government’s authority. Key targets in this phase are police and gendarmerie stations, military bases and camps, mayor’s offices, prefectures, and other state institutions, which are targeted to create a power vacuum and pave the way for JNIM to establish its own proto-governance structures and control the populations. JNIM’s economic warfare activities have gradually increased but also diversified following JNIM’s expansion across the region. Aside from these direct strikes on emblematic representations of state power, JNIM strikes on other infrastructure also serve a variety of specific goals. By targeting educational institutions, JNIM further eradicates symbols of state presence and disrupts the state’s ability to provide a basic public service. Attacking schools also allows JNIM to impose its own ideological framework on the population, as it seeks to replace secular education with religious instruction based on its interpretation of Islam.

By targeting roads, bridges, markets, transportation, and other essential infrastructure, the group simultaneously undermines the financial capacities of states and the logistical capabilities of government forces, and disrupts local economies to manipulate them for its own gain. Such strikes have included large-scale attacks on commercial, supply, and logistics convoys escorted by military forces on major transit routes, primarily in Burkina Faso, but also in Mali. JNIM also frequently sets up irregular checkpoints, wh ere fighters gather intelligence and conduct identity checks in search of military and security force members, state militiamen, and collaborators. When running checkpoints they frequently seize opportunities to extract resources for their sustenance by looting vehicles, motorcycles, and other goods. 

 

JNIM also imposes embargoes and blockades on towns and villages — or whole administrative subdivisions such as the Bandiagara region (“Dogon Country”) in Mali, and in the Kompienga Province of Burkina Faso’s Est region6 — perceived as non-compliant or aligned with the state or pro-government militias. Now a JNIM hallmark, this tactic has been employed in various towns and villages in both Mali and Burkina Faso, and to a lesser degree in Niger. The group has imposed large-scale embargoes — including the sabotage and destruction of water installations and powerlines — on vital agricultural areas, such as the Niono area in Mali and the Sourou Valley in Burkina Faso. 

Beyond causing immense hardship for affected populations, the imposition of embargoes or blockades fragilizes relations between the population and authorities due to the latter’s inability to provide basic services with the potential of sparking civil unrest. Targeting telecommunications installations, including antennas and base stations, enables the group to control information flow. By disrupting communication infrastructure, JNIM not only deprives local populations and businesses of essential services but also gains an advantage in shaping the narrative around its activities and objectives at the local level, often in combination with psychological operations involving preaching and sermons. It further disrupts the coordination and communication capabilities among the military, security forces, and local authorities, making it more difficult for them to alert in the case of attacks and effectively coordinate counter-insurgency operations against JNIM.

 

JNIM’s role in the Sahel’s unfolding crisis

 

The role of JNIM in the ongoing Sahel conflict cannot be understated, as it remains the most active armed actor, with activities spanning eight countries. The prevailing geopolitical turmoil amid successive coups in the central Sahel provides ample opportunity for the group to continue its advance and push its agenda in the absence of a more holistic approach and international cooperation to combat the regional insurgency. Clearly, the group has developed and adopted a comprehensive strategy to undermine state presence and assert its influence in its areas of operation. However, the escalation and prolongation of the conflict continue to present challenges to JNIM. IS Sahel continues to inflict heavy blows on JNIM despite mass mobilization by JNIM. Meanwhile, throughout August and September 2023, no hostilities have been observed between the jihadist rivals, with reports indicating a truce in place and conciliation efforts. At the same time, counter-mobilization and the shifting strategies of states fighting JNIM have also made the war increasingly costly for the group as it takes more frequent blows. This includes the ongoing air war against the group, with government forces significantly leveraging aerial assets, in particular Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. In Burkina Faso, the group faces increased joint operations by government forces and the state-backed VDP militia, whose sphere of influence continues to expand despite high casualty rates on all sides in the conflict, which has reached civil war-like proportions. In Niger, JNIM’s activities remain secondary and are limited to the southwestern parts of Tillaberi, with IS Sahel being the dominant actor in Tillaberi and adjacent regions. In Mali, FAMa and Wagner operations are edging closer to JNIM’s historic strongholds in the Tombouctou and Kidal regions, setting the stage for a new phase of the conflict. In August 2023, FAMa and Wagner took control of the MINUSMA camp and town of Ber following three days of intense combat with JNIM and the ex-rebel bloc, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). 

In response to the FAMa and Wagner offensives, CMA — as part of a coalition of predominantly Tuareg and Arab armed groups known as the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) — and JNIM have simultaneously launched preemptive offensives to move the battle further south through a series of attacks in the Gao, Mopti, and Tombouctou regions. These offensives are still in the early stages, but have resulted in several military camps being overrun and FAMa suffering heavy human and material losses. If this trend continues, it could lead to even greater challenges for FAMa and Wagner to regain momentum and pave the way for JNIM to further consolidate its position in the central Sahel, particularly in Mali. The security vacuum could allow JNIM to expand its influence deeper into the southern regions and beyond its traditional strongholds. This expansion could lead to a more pronounced hybrid governance model, or parastate(s), in which JNIM coexists and sometimes collaborates with other non-state actors such as CSP and IS Sahel. This could lead to a mosaic of territories under varied control and have detrimental consequences for the Malian state, which is already highly fragmented.7 Given the ongoing geopolitical instability and the lack of a unified international response, this scenario could further challenge state sovereignty in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger and complicate international intervention efforts.

Another possible trajectory considers the challenges facing JNIM. The risk of a resumption of hostilities with IS Sahel is high given the fighting between the two groups over the past four years. This, along with increased counter-mobilization efforts by state actors, could strain JNIM’s internal cohesion. It could become difficult for the group to maintain a unified front, leading to fragmentation, which could provide opportunities for IS Sahel to attract dissenting fighters, as was the trend between 2017 and 2019 in Mali and Burkina Faso. Decentralized factions could emerge, operating independently and possibly pursuing different strategies and goals. While this could weaken the overall strategic position of the JNIM, it would also make the conflict more unpredictable and further complicate the conflict landscape in the Sahel. If JNIM’s opponents continue to target civilians in the group’s areas of influence and contested territories, the group could lose further legitimacy in the eyes of the population it claims to protect. Increased attacks on civilians by JNIM itself and collective punitive measures such as embargoes and blockades could contribute to further limiting the JNIM’s ability to implement its governing agenda, leading to difficulties in maintaining influence and control over the population.

Given the protracted nature of the conflict and the human and economic costs, it is deeply troubling that a reset of the crisis is emerging after more than a decade of sustained violence. Despite similarities with the onset of the crisis in 2012, an entirely different and new security context is developing in the central Sahel, characterized by a steadily deteriorating security situation and political instability in which the international community has limited ability to make a difference. Regardless of how the conflict evolves, JNIM will continue to play a central role as the predominant armed actor.