Historically, the concept of jihad was based primarily on one fundamental line: waging war against any person or territory that was intolerant of Muslims. Many individuals, inspired either by early Islamic history or the later teachings of the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, adhered to these original principles only.

However, in the modern world, the world of jihadism has undergone an unprecedented transformation. Jihadist groups are now divided along territorial lines, political beliefs, and religious ideology. This has opened a new front line in the world of jihad, where confrontations based on these factors are growing. 

Lately, a new schism  has emerged between Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) over ideologies, geographical area, and role in the international order. This structural rift became palpable in the recent polemics and audio messages released by the ISKP fr om its media outlet, Al-Azaim Media Foundation.

The TTP has become the target of antagonism, in part because ISKP sees it as an extension of the Afghan Taliban, whose leadership gives refuge to it. The messages released by ISKP described the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as “calves of the same cow.” They also mentioned that the TTP is fighting under the direction and control of Taliban emir Haibatullah Akhundzada, and that the strategies and attacks the TTP carries out in Pakistan are directly coordinated with the Taliban’s supreme leader.  

 The ISKP stance toward the TTP is largely based on the perception that it is an extension of the Afghan Taliban, under which it has taken refuge. The ISKP called the Afghan Taliban and the TTP “calves of the same cow.” According to a pamphlet released by ISKP on July 14, the TTP is fighting under the guidance and dominance of Afghan Taliban emir Haibatullah Akhundzada and the attacks and strategies that the TTP perpetrate in Pakistan are all executed under the direct guidance of the Afghan Taliban’s leader. 

 

Founded in 2015, ISKP, the regional branch of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, was initially based in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, Kunar and Nangarhar. However, upon the withdrawal of the United States and with the takeover of the Taliban, ISKP gained momentum while becoming the most influential jihadist group nationwide, deepening its footprints throughout Afghanistan and even across its borders. 

With the rise in size and in number grew the enmity and animosity for Afghan Taliban. But that was not always the case. During the early years of the Islamic State, the Taliban had been the supporters of the group’s struggles in the Middle East. Both advocated the concept of the caliphate, and the Taliban supported the IS war in Syria and Iraq. 

However, this relationship took a nosedive following the recalibration of IS policy toward the Khorasan region, wh ere they initiated their jihad. Taliban-Islamic State relations took a dramatic turn following the 2015 letter by the Taliban leader to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of IS, urging him not to challenge the legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban by not accepting Mullah Omar as the Ameer-ul-Muminin (Leader of the Faithful). 

The Taliban leadership was adamant that “jihad in Afghanistan … should be under a single banner and single leadership” – in effect, demanding that IS stay out of the country. Hence, fr om this point, the strategic differences became a bone of contention between the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State.

 

This hostility culminated in religious differences as ISKP rejected the Taliban’s preaching, accusing them of practicing polytheism. ISKP also attacked the Taliban’s dealings with Western countries, especially the United States, and being influenced by their “deviant” political system, democracy. In the ISKP narrative, the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan is in direct contradiction to the Islamic political system. Due to these reasons, ISKP termed the Taliban as murtadeens (apostates from Islam.)

 

Since then, the  question of “Deobandism versus Salafism” has became the central contention between the two groups. According to ISKP, the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are not even following the basic and true principles of the Deoband school of thought that initially emerged in India. As per ISKP, the true teachings of Deoband were altered by scholars during the British period in India for their own vested interests. Due to this, the strain of Deobandism that the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are following is fabricated and altered in ISKP’s view.

According to ISKP, many affiliates of the TTP abandoned the group and joined the Islamic State in their struggle because of this. These included personalities such as Hafiz Saeed Khan, Shahid Ullah shahid, Gul Zaman Fateh, Sheikh Abu Saeed Bajauri, Sheikh Abu Yahya Bajouri, and others. 

ISKP has categorically criticized the TTP for its narrow scope of operations, which are confined to the area of Pakistan and Afghanistan. A new polemic by the Islamic Stat’s Al-Azaim claimed that “the TTP is crossing the same bridge that the Afghan Taliban crossed.” According to ISKP, unlike their “global-based” jihad, the TTP has strictly narrowed down its operations to a particular society, which ISKP claims is in contrast to the true image of jihad. 

ISKP is against the established international liberal world order and the economic and political domains that comes with it. However, according to ISKP, the TTP still abides by the international rules-based order, especially wh ere democracy is concerned. ISKP has been particularly critical of the past attempts at reconciliation and deals between the TTP and Pakistani state. 

However, the TTP has thus far refrained from openly responding to any of these criticism by ISKP openly. This silence of the TTP may be on orders from the Afghan Taliban, as they cannot afford another front brewing among the jihadi groups in the region, thus destabilizing regional security even further.