Situation, Facts and Events
01.10.2024
Afghanistan: Resistance to Taliban in the North
Based on reports from South Asia Counter Terrorism Portal (SATP), India
On September 11, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed, and five were injured in an attack by the National Resistance Front (NRF) at Dawoodzi village in the Qarabagh District of Kabul Province.
On September 8, 2024, two fighters of a Taliban intelligence unit were killed in an ambush set by the NRF along a frequently used route in the Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province. NRF also seized their weapons and equipment.
On September 4, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed and another four persons, including three civilians (one of them, a child), as well as a Taliban fighter, were injured, when NRF launched an attack targeting Taliban cadres near the old Taloqan District of Takhar Province. A local source disclosed that the injuries resulted from a bicycle bomb explosion in the same area.
On September 3, 2024, NRF killed two Taliban fighters, and captured weapons and equipment, in Rabat Village in the Injil District of Herat Province.
On September 2, 2024, NRF ambushed a Taliban vehicle on the Herat-Farah highway, killing two Taliban fighters and injuring three, in the Azizabad area of Shindand District, Herat Province. The Taliban cadres’ vehicle was also destroyed.
On September 2, 2024, NRF ambushed a Taliban intelligence unit, killing two Taliban fighters and injuring one, in the Khataian area of Taloqan District, Takhar Province. A Toyota Hilux vehicle carrying the Taliban fighters was destroyed.
On September 1, 2024, three Taliban fighters were killed and another was injured when NRF conducted a rocket attack on the Taliban Police headquarters in the Bangi District of Takhar Province.
In any incident on the same day, two Taliban fighters were killed while riding a motorcycle, in an attack by the NRF in Herat City, Herat Province. Weapons and the motorcycle were seized.
According to partial data collated by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), since August 15, 2021, when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, 904 Taliban fighters have been killed, 295 injured in 236 incidents by NRF; 113 NRF fighters have also been killed (data till September 11, 2024).
Meanwhile, as reported on September 1, 2024, Ahmad Massoud, the leader of NRF, asserted that his group had carried out 207 ‘military operations’ around Afghanistan in 2024, and that he has 5,000 ‘soldiers’ under his control.
The NRF's declared objectives are to:
Establish social justice, equality and culture
Provide freedom for all citizens of Afghanistan
Preserve Democracy in Afghanistan
Uphold women's rights and human rights
Revive rational Islam in Afghanistan
Ideological objectives often promoted in the NRF’s declaration emphasize social justice, decentralization, and freedom from foreign intervention.
NRF is the main, armed opposition group the Taliban faces, and was formed in August 2021 by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, Ahmad Massoud, and Former Defense Minister Bismillah Khan.
Ahmad Massoud is the son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, who led resistance efforts against the Soviets and Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s. Ahmed Massoud reportedly operates from his ancestral homeland in the predominantly ethnic Tajik Panjshir Valley. Known as one of the most impregnable regions in Afghanistan, and located about 100 kilometres north of Kabul, it is a strategically advantageous location, to build a resistance movement.
After 2021, Massoud was joined by former members of the Afghan Army, Police and other security officials, who had been abandoned by the US but wanted to continue the fight against the Taliban. Ethnically, NRF comprises Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, along with a few anti-Taliban Pashtuns.
NRF is fighting for a pluralistic state of Afghanistan that unites all ethnic groups under a decentralized democratic government, and has support from all ethnic groups across Afghanistan.
Given its geostrategic positioning, surrounded by the Hindu Kush Mountain range, the Panjshir Valley grants immense tactical advantage for guerrilla warfare. NRF mostly engages in hit- and-run attacks, and most of its operations occur under the cover of darkness, enhancing operational security and minimizing civilian exposure.
NRF also has the support of the diaspora communities. It has a presence on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, Clubhouse, and other social networking platforms. NRF leaders and supporters are organizing, mobilizing, spreading awareness, and influencing public opinion in every possible way, and this is the Front's strongest point.
The bulk of operations in the North has been reported from the provinces of Panjshir, Kapisa, Parwan, Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Takhar.
NRF is joined on the battlefield by the Afghan Freedom Front (AFF). Former Afghan National Army (ANA) Chief of General Staff and Acting Minister of Defense, Yasin Zia, leads AFF. While AFF and NRF retain distinct identities, they collaborate in operations against the Taliban.
On April 11, 2024, the two forces, held their first joint meeting. In this virtual meeting, Yasin Zia issued a call to action for anti-Taliban factions to unite for a three-month offensive against the group. Ahmad Massoud, on his part, lauded the AFF's aggressive stance against the Taliban and praised the recent resurgence of AFF's military activities against the Taliban.
The Taliban regime, is presently fighting on three fronts: with the forces of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP); with the resistance forces in the North; and, sporadically, with the Pakistan Army along the disputed Afghan-Pakistan border.
However, though NRF mounts frequent attacks on the Taliban forces, the ‘regime’ is hardly affected. In terms of military capacity, with the US military hardware the Taliban inherited, including rifles, armored vehicles, night-vision device, etc., its capacities remain significant and cannot be matched by the NRF, which receives no outside military support.
Nevertheless, the expanding sphere of guerilla operations by the resistance forces have significant disruptive potential for a regime that is struggling to establish some semblance of administrative and economic coherence within a situation of multiple and enveloping crises.
Source: Институт Ближнего Востока