According to American security experts, the current situation in Syria is ideal for the Islamic State (IS) to exploit to promote its return and resurgence not only in the country but throughout the region.

Still, the situation is complex. While ISIS will almost certainly gain from the absence of the Assad regime, providing ISIS with greater freedom of maneuver and movement in the country, the root cause that drove Syrian grievances, and thus was a boon for ISIS, was the oppressive Assad regime. With Assad gone, ISIS may have to work harder to recruit, focusing on the grievances that still exist, from sectarianism to socio-economic inequality to faultlines that exist and may be exacerbated between Syria’s tribes, clans, and militias. 

Looking at openly available and unclassified data, ISIS attacks in Syria alone tripled from last year, hovering around 700 for 2024. They have also improved in sophistication, increased in lethality, and become more dispersed geographically. Given the Islamic State’s immense war chest, even in a diminished state, the group will have the resources necessary to rebuild its organization, recruit new members, and go on the offensive. The most obvious targets are the prisons and detention camps in northeastern Syria, currently guarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish militia allied with the United States. 

ISIS is watching the SDF closely, particularly as clashes erupted between the Turkish-backed Syria National Army (SNA) and the SDF. The Kurds came under assault in both Kobani and Manbij, assisted by Turkish drones and other military assets. 

In northern Syria, a ceasefire between the SNA and the Kurds is tenuous, and there are concerns that the Kurds will lose Kobani, which is important both geographically and symbolically. The SDF is also facing major challenges in Deir ez-Zor, with protests against its rule in Raqqa and al-Hasakah by Sunni Arabs. If these clashes continue, and if Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan pushes the Turkish military to build out Türkiye’s buffer zone and/or take the fight to the Kurds, it will impact the counter-ISIS fight. 

If Kurdish troops are pulled away from guarding the prisons and detention centers, ISIS will likely wait for the opportune time to strike, similar to the prison break in al-Hasakah in January 2022, and in line with ISIS’s ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign. 

There are over 9,500 ISIS militants being held in over 20 separate SDF facilities throughout Syria. That is in addition to 42,000 associated family members—women and children—in camps like al-Hol and al-Roj.

In the near to medium term, ISIS is likely to continue increasing its operational tempo while also building the fundamentals of the organization. After seeing how successful Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been, ISIS will also likely dedicate more bandwidth to governance, demonstrating that it can maintain a shadow government in parts of Syria outside of HTS’s control. 

Moreover, if there are hardliners within HTS that aren’t amenable to the group’s more moderate and pragmatic approach, ISIS could seek to poach these militants and bring them into the fold. A range of Chechen, Balkan, and Central Asia jihadists still populate HTS’s ranks, which include hundreds of foreign fighters among them, including Europeans. Many hardcore militants have been jettisoned from HTS over the years, but almost certainly, not everyone will be on board with the group’s current state-building project, and fissures will inevitably emerge and potentially worsen.

The most significant obstacle to ISIS’s prospects in Syria is a strong and unified country under the command of a single authority that can exercise a monopoly on the use of force over a clearly defined, sovereign territory. However, with how fractious the country is, and with the Kurds de facto in charge of the Northeast, clashes between Arabs and Kurds, and the uncertainty of HTS rule, Syria is very unlikely to be stable and unified. 

ISIS is likely to continue growing, which only further demonstrates the importance of aggressive U.S. actions to blunt the group, as occurred with U.S. airstrikes last weekend against ISIS camps in central Syria, with 75 separate targets hit. 

Again on Monday, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced more targeted strikes, noting in a press release: “The strikes against the ISIS leaders, operatives, and camps were conducted as part of the ongoing mission to disrupt, degrade, and defeat ISIS, preventing the terrorist group from conducting external operations and to ensure that ISIS does not seek opportunities to reconstitute in central Syria.” 12 ISIS militants were killed in Monday’s strikes.

As always, an ISIS resurgence anywhere can help boost the group’s global network. In many ways, when it comes to the various branches, affiliates, and franchise groups of the Islamic State, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. An ISIS resurgence in Syria would be featured prominently in the group’s propaganda, which is then amplified by a broader ecosystem of media networks, some official and many unofficial, to further spread its reach, while radicalizing and inspiring new supporters and followers. 

Just as it did with the war in Gaza, ISIS will look for unique and innovative narratives to frame the fall of Assad and HTS rule in Syria in ways that help boost the Islamic State’s appeal. If ISIS can carve out some space in Syria to operate relatively unmolested, it will ramp up its propaganda, especially if it is able to feature high-profile prison breaks or other complex operations. 

The group has already begun increasing its fundraising capabilities, including through the use of extortion, which points to a revitalized intelligence network, especially at local levels. For Europe, the United States, and many Western countries, the worst-case scenario is that ISIS is able to rebuild an external operations planning capability from Syria, something it has lacked in recent years.

President-elect Trump has openly mused about withdrawing the remaining 900 U.S. troops currently operating in Syria from the country. In a recent press conference, Trump mentioned the role played by Türkiye in Syria, positively referencing his relationship with Erdogan, and talking about some of the geopolitical dynamics at play. 

It is not inconceivable that, upon taking office, Trump looks to withdraw the remaining U.S. troops in the country, leaving the counter-ISIS fight to Ankara, which would ultimately be a benefit to ISIS as it seeks to regroup, particularly in the near term. Even if the U.S. does withdraw altogether, or draw down its presence further, remaining engaged in Syria will be critical to keeping the Islamic State off balance. This means U.S. airstrikes and raids against ISIS commanders, high-value targets, and operational planners will remain a necessary pillar of the counter-ISIS fight in Syria, no matter how events transpire in the country over the coming weeks and months ahead.

Main conclusions

The current situation in Syria is ideal for the Islamic State to exploit for its return and resurgence not just in the country but throughout the region.

If the SDF is distracted from guarding the prisons and detention centers, ISIS will likely wait for the opportune time to strike, similar to the prison break in al-Hasakah in January 2022, and in line with ISIS’s ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign

If there are hardliners within HTS that aren’t amenable to the group’s more moderate and pragmatic approach, ISIS could seek to poach these militants and bring them into the fold.

ISIS is likely to continue growing, which only further demonstrates the importance of aggressive U.S. actions to blunt the group, as occurred with U.S. airstrikes last weekend against ISIS camps in central Syria.