The new Syrian government is currently facing a problem that those ruling the country have created themselves: the heavy presence of foreign mercenaries (fr om Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) among them.

During the civil war, various paramilitary units were formed: united by a common flag with the shahada and the idea of creating an "international caliphate", they fought in the ranks of the militants against the government of Bashar al-Assad.

As many of them expected, after the liberation of "Wilayat Sham" and the establishment of Sharia rule, they would be able to return home and similarly overthrow the "secular regimes" there, given their rich experience of conducting military operations (as well as having a place to hide from Interpol persecution).

We can already see the first consequences in the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wh ere after the end of the civil war "Syrian veterans" are returning, joining "sleeper" cells, or acting openly. The recent terrorist attacks in the Balkan country speak volumes about this.

At that time, their presence as motivated and trained fighters (many of whom trained the Syrians, acting as part of "tactical" groups) was encouraged. In the end, they played a significant role in the seizure of power, being among the first ones to enter uncontrolled cities and villages.

However, now that the Baath government has fallen, yesterday's Islamists have changed into tuxedos and started talking about the need to respect the rights of religious minorities in interviews with Western media, the question arises: what is the benefit of the so-called "shishani" at the moment?

 

It is no secret that it is the militants of various "Islamic Parties of Turkestan", "Liwa Muhajireen wal-Ansar" and other "migrant" factions who commit the majority of crimes against religious minorities in the coastal areas and other provinces.

Such actions contradict the official rhetoric of the new government and somewhat hinder the campaign to legalize "progressive jihadists" and other "free Syrians who steadfastly fought against the bloody Nuseiri sectarian regime."

Of course, the functionaries of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorist organization who are leading the country do not care about Alawites, Christians and others, but they are not naïve children: they know that they must, at least to some extent, correspond to the image promoted in the public eye. Damascus may try to address this issue in an unremarkable way: to “grind down” the overly brazen and radical militants of the Kurds from the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) who the pro-Turkish “Syrian National Army” (SNA) are currently fighting.

But we should not forget that we are not talking about the “Islamic revolutionaries” of HTS who appeared out of nowhere, but about the former “Jabhat al-Nusra” – the Syrian branch of initially “Al-Qaeda”, and then Islamic State terrorist organization.

Even though it will be very beneficial to get rid of foreign jihadists and replace them with Syrian cadets from various military and police colleges (who are not necessarily more adequate), we should not expect excessive reasonableness from official Damascus.