The rivalry between the terrorist groups Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISKP is largely based on the Deobandi versus Salafi creed and the debate over local versus global jihad.

The TTP supports the Afghan Taliban, an existential opponent of ISKP. The TTP leadership has pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban's supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada.

Meanwhile, ISKP has been aggressively campaigning against the Taliban, claiming that they are ideologically inconsistent. The group has also killed several Taliban leaders for deflecting fr om the path of "true jihad" by striking a deal with the US (the 2020 Doha Agreement) to regain power in Afghanistan. 

The TTP has found itself at the center of this antagonism, but adopted a pragmatic approach. In late May 2024, TTP leadership council member Qari Shoaib Bajauri criticized ISKP for accepting deviant elements from the TTP, al-Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban. In clarifying the TTP's position on ISKP, he first emphasized that the groups do not have a secret ceasefire or partnership. In a video posted on social media X, Bajauri stated, "TTP is not at war with ISKP to avoid opening another front”, and emphasised that the group is focusing on its primary goal of establishing a Taliban-like theocracy in Pakistan. 

 

In retaliation, ISKP issued a 47-minute audio statement on June 2 dismissing any cooperation with the TTP, while calling it a “tribal Deobandi local militia” which has restricted its militant campaign to Pakistan and does not have a global jihad agenda. It bears mention that since 2018, the TTP has announced that it does not have any agenda beyond Pakistan. 

Furthermore, ISKP alleged that the Taliban controls the TTP’s ideological posture and operational trajectory in Pakistan, a reference to two Taliban-facilitated, short-lived ceasefires between Pakistan and the TTP in 2021 and 2022. ISKP also frames the TTP as a proxy of pro-democracy religious-political parties, such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUIF), in Pakistan. The TTP leadership actually has reached out to Pakistan’s religious-political parties to forge a unified front for establishing a shariah system in Pakistan.

 

A month later, on July 24, ISKP published another 71-minute audio release targeting the TTP’s former deputy leader Sheikh Khalid Haqqani’s past stance of questioning IS’ claim to a self-styled caliphate owing to its lack of territorial control and disapproval from the ulema (religious scholars), jihadist groups and the ummah (Muslim countries). In retaliation, ISKP termed Haqqani as an “uneducated cleric” who lacked religious knowledge and dismissed his criticisms as unfounded. 

ISKP questioned the TTP’s oath of allegiance to Haibatullah whom it called a deviant controlling a small corrupt emirate in Afghanistan. In sum, ISK’s propaganda publications, such as the magazine Khorasan Ghag (in Pashto), routinely criticise the TTP for its restricted approach to jihadism, subservience to the Taliban, and soft stance towards pro-democratic Pakistani religious-political parties and the Shia community.

The TTP-ISKP’s evolving antagonism brings into sharp focus the shifting alliances and rivalries of Pakistan’s fluid threat landscape. Though both groups have avoided targeting each other on the battlefield, the growing propaganda war can degenerate into armed clashes very soon. This scenario is critical for the Pakistani government, as it is currently struggling with an increased terrorist threat in both the north and southwest of the country, which border Afghanistan and Iran. Terrorist activity by the TTP and its supporters has increased significantly since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, an ethnic separatist movement is growing in Balochistan, with its members resorting to increasingly violent methods of protest. The Baloch insurgents are also operating from the Sunni province of Sistan-Baluchestan in Iran, wh ere the majority of the population is ethnic Baloch.

To navigate this complex landscape, Pakistan will have to merge its security, political, and diplomatic efforts to stabilize the domestic situation. At the political level, addressing the issues of the ethnic Baloch and Pashtuns will be critical to reducing the influence of radicalized groups. Diplomatically, Islamabad will have to engage with Tehran and Kabul to address the issue of external safe havens provided to Pakistani anti-government groups.