Al-Qaeda in Yemen has suffered a series of strikes that have killed several of its leaders, including three in less than a month.

Last week, al-Qaeda in Yemen’s leader, al-Makna Abu Mohammed al-Hatli al-Makki, a Saudi national, was killed in a U.S. raid on the group’s stronghold in the Masinaa district, south of the city of Ataq, capital of the southern Shabwa province.

Ayoub al-Lahji, known as the “emir of Lahj province” and considered one of the group’s most feared IED experts, was also killed along with several of his colleagues in U.S. raids in the Khatib district of Markha province, near the border with the central provinces of Abyan and Al-Bayda. The raids came days after the death of the organization's field commander, Abu Ali al-Daithy, who held the position of "emir of Kifah", in a US raid in Shabwa province. 

 

Al-Qaeda in Yemen leader Mohammed Baghamish al-Makna Abu Yusuf Al-Muhammadi Al-Hadrami was killed along with another leader named Abu Assem al-Sanani earlier this month in a motorcycle bomb attack in the al-Samad area, east of the city of Marib in the northeast of the country.

These blows to al-Qaeda in Yemen coincide with the continuation of a military operation launched by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) against it in Abyan province in late 2022, called "Arrows of the East", in Wadi Omran in the Mudi district of Abyan province in the south of the country.

Al-Qaeda's presence is currently concentrated in Abyan, Shabwa, Marib and Al-Bayda, located in the south and center of the country, with diverse terrain varying fr om rugged mountains to vast deserts, and an extensive logistics network that ensures ease of movement for the group members.

 

 Ali al-Dahab, a researcher specializing in military and strategic issues, believes that al-Qaeda’s concentration in the south and center of the country is explained by the special character of these areas in terms of geography and social structure: “Geographically, these are vast desert areas with mountain jungles, desert or sparsely populated highlands wh ere al-Qaeda in Yemen can establish groups, hide, store weapons, train, and receive weapons by sea due to its proximity to the Arabian Sea or by land fr om neighboring countries.” On the social side, he said that in these areas there is “almost a complete absence of secular education” and “extremist religious practices are in place.” 

Al-Qaeda in Yemen lost Khaled Baterfi last year, who was replaced by Saad al-Awlaki, and they also lost Khaled Mohammed Zeidan, the son of the organization’s leader Seif al-Adel. Notably, the White House announced in 2023 that al-Qaeda in Yemen had links to Iran, which Tehran denied at the time, calling the allegations “false and ridiculous.” The explanation for the elimination of al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen is that there is an intra-species struggle within the organization, leading to assassinations and executions. The abovementioned Baterfi was not called a “martyr” when his death was announced, meaning that he was obviously a victim of an internal struggle. However, tribal and other local sources associated with the organization indicated that Baterfi died of an “insidious disease” from which he had suffered for a long time, and his condition worsened after the death of the doctor who oversaw his treatment, Abu Abdullah al-Suri, known as al-Qaeda’s doctor.

 

The organization is currently trying to restructure itself, including its leadership, and has started ridding of some elements seen as an organizational burden in terms of discipline or suspected of having ties to foreign intelligence services.

There have been truces and prisoner exchanges between the organization and the Houthis, especially after Ansar Allah's participation in the war in the Gaza Strip. The most recent exchange took place, but seemingly it was not an official one. There are ways of communication between them that are not at the highest level which means that there are separate communication channels that have played a role in bringing them closer.

Somalia's al-Shabaab plays a role in this, and this cooperation has extended to al-Shabaab as well. In case of these groups, there is an exchange of technology and information. There may be clashes between al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Houthis, but these would be exceptions, as over the past year there has been no such a wave of violence between the two sides as the year before. According to several Yemeni sources, there will be no cooperation between the Houthis and the Americans against Al-Qaeda, nor between Al-Qaeda and the Houthis against the Americans, because there are no rules for coalitions against each other. At the moment there are contentious issues that are put aside in accordance with the ceasefire between them.

 

According to sources, the Americans are working on the ground both against the Houthis and Al-Qaeda, and they obtain information through satellites and drones. As for the elimination of field commanders, this may lead to new leaders emerging. Because of this, the blows that Al-Qaeda suffered in Yemen will not impact it significantly, and the organization has been in a calm state since 2017 after a strong defeat that took place in Al-Bayda. The external logistical support for the organization seems to have been significantly reduced, and the fighting capacity of the organization has decreased compared to what it was before. 

In January 2017, U.S. fighter jets carried out airstrikes on Islamic State (IS) targets in al-Bayda, South Yemen, including an airborne assault that, as Washington stated at the time, killed 14 IS militants and left an American serviceman dead. 

 

Al-Qaeda has been present in Yemen since the beginning of the third millennium, but it prefers to concentrate in certain areas for a number of reasons. The most important reason is the natural conditions of these areas in terms of their topography, mountainous terrain, extensive roads and openness, as well as connections to many provinces wh ere the organization can easily move. 

Moreover, there is an important factor, namely efficient coordination between Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Houthis. The Ansar Allah (Houthis) movement has been working to establish training camps for these extremist groups over the past year, and the three most important camps allocated by the Houthis to the organization are located in Al-Jawf, Saada and As-Sama, previously in Sanaa, and recently the groups have been transferred to Al-Bayda, and some of them to the provinces of Abyan and Shabwa. 

This coordination between al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Houthis takes place under the leadership of Seif al-Adel, based in Tehran, and in the context of the ideological orientation adopted by the Houthis and al-Qaeda in their apparent hostility to the United States. The growing American activity in Yemen is due to their focus on the presence and movement of al-Qaeda in Yemen with the help of the Somali al-Shabaab movement and in coordination with the Houthis, who transport them by fishing boats to the ports of Hodeida and smuggle them overland. 

   

The death of al-Qaeda in Yemen leader Khaled Baterfi and the appointment of Saad al-Awlaki as his successor has brought renewed attention to the activities of the organization which in recent years had significantly decreased due to the contradictions that were tearing it apart. The appointment of al-Awlaki, in his 40s, as the current leader is an attempt to resurrect and regroup the organization which was restless under his predecessor.

Al-Awlaki's rise to leadership of al-Qaeda in Yemen would be "a major rebound for the organization, which has been suffering from a financial crisis, in addition to the continuing differences between the organization and many Yemeni tribes during the time of Khaled Batarfi," said Assim al-Sabri, a researcher of militant Islamic groups.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, or al-Qaeda in Yemen) was founded in 2009 by Osama bin Laden through a merger of Saudi and Yemeni groups and emerged during the chaos caused by the war in Yemen, with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels fighting a Saudi-led military coalition since 2015. The group claimed responsibility for the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, France, which killed 12 people. As such, AQAP is considered one of the most important and dangerous branches of the parent organization, but its activity has declined significantly since Baterfi took over from Qasim al-Rimi, who was killed in a US strike in February 2020, a major blow to the organization. The newly appointed al-Awlaki, a native of the al-Awlaki tribe in Shabwa province, is one of the organization’s most prominent and active field commanders. Al-Awlaki is a member of the organization’s Shura Council and is on the list of the US “Rewards for Justice Program.” The United States has offered a reward of up to $6 million for anyone who provides information about him. The US State Department says al-Awlaki “has publicly called for attacks against the United States and its allies.”

Al-Sabri points out that al-Awlaki, who is the most wanted man by the US military, is now actively working to resolve all of these issues and put an end to the organization’s differences with Yemeni tribes.

As for the organization’s external operations, Al-Sabri believes that al-Qaeda in Yemen is suffering from internal crises that prevent it from carrying out any external actions, but he does not rule out that the group could try to carry out operations in the West. Tribal and local sources confirm that al-Awlaki, who was appointed at the direction of Baterfi, enjoys the support of most of the organization’s leaders and members, and that his appointment has the blessing of the field and religious leaders, and that there is great optimism among members of the organization about his ability to reorganize the front after almost two years of decline: “Al-Awlaki can use his connections at the current stage to rebuild the organization’s tribal incubator, especially in Shabwa, which has been a prominent stronghold and staging area for the organization’s operations, and to rebuild its strongholds destroyed by government forces in Shabwa and Abyan.” It is also noted that in recent months, AQAP propaganda has placed great emphasis on operations against Yemeni groups supported by the UAE.