As a number of Pakistani experts point out, since the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, the country has become a hub for arms supplies and funding for terrorist groups led by the Taliban.

The hasty collapse of previous government left behind the stockpiles of military equipment. Various international reports have highlighted that these weapons have fallen into the hands of militant groups due to their close alliance with Taliban regime. Simultaneously, illegal financial networks run by drug trafficking, illicit mining, and foreign sympathizers have strengthened, allowing the terrorists groups to exert and expand their influence across the South Asian region. 

With porous borders and weak state controls, Afghanistan has become a critical node in the global terrorism supply chain, posing a severe threat to regional and international peace and security. On 12th Feb 2025, the 35th UNSC Sanctions Monitoring Team report pointed out that Afghanistan is an epicenter of terrorism. The major findings of the report revealed that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghan (TTA) provides financial and operational support to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Noor Wali Mehsud the Chief commander of TTP is getting $43,000 monthly from TTA. 

Terrorists and extremists’ organization like ISIS, ETIM, Al-Qaeda, and BLA have safe havens in Afghanistan, whereas TTP is establishing new training centers in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika. Pakistan’s security concerns are validated, with TTP responsible for 600 attacks in just six months.  

Moreover, a recent audit in Badghis has exposed that a large cache of US made weapons is missing from the Afghan army depots of the 3rd Brigade HQ, 207th Al-Farooq Corps. The stolen arms, including AK-47s, M16s, M4s, Beretta pistols, and thousands of rounds of ammunition, raise serious security concerns about their diversion to terrorist groups. 

In 2024, the Pakistan security forces have recovered US dollars and foreign made ammunition from terrorists’ groups, further proving Afghanistan as a main supplier of weapons to terrorists’ groups. The killing of Badruddin from Afghanistan’s Al-Farooq Corps, fighting for TTP with US weapons, exposes the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s complicity. 

 

Pakistan’s government has highlighted at various occasions that the presence of US advanced weapons in Afghanistan, left behind in the aftermath of the withdrawal of its troops has been an issue of profound concern for the safety and security of Pakistan and its citizens. The interim Afghan government (IAG) has repeatedly dismissed requests from Pakistan to rein in the TTP. 

Additionally, on 15th February 2025, Dr. Muhammad Asif Siddiqui, former Meshrano Jirga member, in an interview with Amu TV revealed that with the assistance of Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda has increased its influence in Afghan villages, particularly in Kabul. He also exposed the frequent meeting between Taliban and al-Qaeda and their financial backing. The killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in 2022 is a proof of their close alliances. 

Furthermore, Mushtaq alias Kohi, a senior commander of the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) Majeed Brigade, has been stabbed to death in Kabul, Afghanistan, marking a significant setback for the terrorist group. Kohi had strong ties with Aslam Baloch (Aslam Acchu), the former BLA leader killed in a 2019 suicide bombing in Kandahar. A key member of the BLA’s Command Council, Kohi played a central role in orchestrating terrorists attacks on Pakistani security forces, infrastructure and Chinese national on its soil. 

 

The very fact of the presence of BLA leaders in Kabul gives Islamabad a reason to accuse the Taliban of directly supporting Baloch separatists, but at the same time, their elimination in Afghanistan speaks of active measures taken by Pakistani intelligence in Afghanistan itself.

 

In this regard, Pakistani experts welcome the demand of US President Donald Trump to return the American weapons left after the withdrawal of American troops. However, it is noted that despite this call, expecting Taliban cooperation is unrealistic. The issue demands urgent global attention to address regional security threats.

Pakistanis have also noted the long public absence of Khalifa Serajuddin Haqqani, a prominent leader of the Haqqani Network, from Afghanistan’s political scene. This has sparked fresh speculation about growing internal divisions within the ruling Taliban faction. He was reported to be in the UAE following a recent trip to Saudi Arabia, and his absence from official events has raised questions about his relationship with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) leadership. The IEA has repeatedly denied any suggestion of a rift, but signs of internal tension are hard to ignore. The Haqqanis were seen as key figures in the Taliban movement for years, especially after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. However, with the group’s takeover in 2021, rifts have begun to emerge, particularly between the Haqqani Network and the Kandahar faction that dominates the current Afghan government’s leadership. 

Khalifa Serajuddin Haqqani’s prolonged absence from the political arena is far from common. Despite international sanctions and travel restrictions, he is believed to be living in the UAE, which says a lot about the internal dynamics of the Taliban regime. His last public appearance came after a trip to Saudi Arabia in December, after which he has been largely absent from public view. This suggests that this may not just be a diplomatic hiatus; it may be a sign of growing disillusionment within one of the Taliban’s most influential wings.

 While IEA officials continue to downplay the differences between the Haqqani Network and the Kandahar leadership, it is increasingly clear that policy differences, particularly on sensitive issues like girls’ education, have heightened tensions. The IEA’s official stance on women’s education and freedoms has drawn considerable criticism not only from the international community but also from within the movement itself.

There is a widespread belief that figures like Haqqani, with their military and ideological backgrounds, may not fully share Kandahar’s more pragmatic and politically cautious approach. These concerns are aggravated by the recent defection of Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, another senior IEA official. Stanikzai’s departure from Afghanistan sends a worrying signal of growing disillusionment within the Taliban, particularly among those unhappy with the centralized control of the Kandahari-led government. It suggests that even within the IEA, loyalty to the regime may be weakening under the weight of ideological and strategic differences. While the Haqqani Network may try to downplay these differences, their absence from the political arena sends a message to the international community.

If political instability within the Taliban keeps escalating, it could further complicate international engagement with Afghanistan, especially as the world watches closely for signs of change or a possible shift in the Taliban’s approach to governance. The question now is not only whether Khalifa Serajuddin Haqqani will return to Afghanistan, but also whether his return will mark a broader change within the Taliban that could once again reshape Afghanistan’s political landscape.

The internal tensions within the Taliban may not be as easily hidden as their representatives would like to believe, and they will undoubtedly have a long-term impact on Afghanistan’s future and its place on the global stage.