Situation, Facts and Events
19.09.2022
About the armed opposition in Afghanistan
There are two predominant trends in the Afghan security landscape today. On the one hand, Taliban, a radical Islamist movement (banned in the Russian Federation), prevents the expansion of the terrorist organization IS-K (banned in the Russian Federation), and on the other hand, the Taliban are strenuously trying to suppress the insurgency, which is gaining momentum in the north of the country.
Against this background, other anti-Taliban groups associated with the previous government also emerged. Foreign terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (banned in the Russian Federation) are less active, but perhaps more dangerous to the security of Afghanistan. Presently they remain loyal to the Taliban, but under certain circumstances, they may rebel against the new government.
IS-K
In the months following the Taliban takeover, IS-K carried out more terrorist attacks in Afghanistan than ever before. The upsurge in violence appears to have been caused by two factors: the chaotic aftermath of a Taliban victory over Afghan government forces, which created a security vacuum in parts of the country’s east, and a change in IS-K tactics towards more frequent and localized attacks.
The tactical shift began earlier, between 2019 and 2020, when IS-K was under constant military pressure, responding with decentralization and establishment of underground networks with a focus on urban warfare.
Having lost ground in the rural areas, IS-K established itself in the cities with a flurry of raids and sniper attacks on Taliban forces after their victory. At first, the focus on subversion in urban areas worked, as the group operated in familiar terrain, recruiting educated, predominantly Salafi, people in cities like Kabul and Nangarhar. The fact that the Taliban had limited experience in dealing with extremist cells in urban areas was a big advantage for IS-K.
The mass escape of hundreds of imprisoned IS-K militants during the Taliban’s takeover also gave momentum and energy to its supporters. The fugitives reactivated the nets and launched a series of attacks on Taliban forces.
In late 2021, the Taliban began to gain the upper hand, launching a vicious counter-terrorism operation against IS-K in an urban area and forcing its fighters, whose attacks had been greatly reduced, to change tactics again. The group lost some of its operational capacity in eastern Nangarhar province, but continued to attack Taliban forces in the neighboring Kunar province, including occasional ambushes at isolated checkpoints using heavy weaponry.
In addition to its stronghold in the east, the group has expanded its geographic coverage with sporadic attacks in the south and west and more frequent attacks in northern Afghanistan. Instead of confronting the Taliban militarily, IS-K has primarily targeted Afghanistan’s Shia, Hazara and Sufi minorities, against whom it was opposed fr om the start.
Most of these attacks were fragmented, suggesting a limited presence of IS-K fighters in these areas. However, attacks in the north looked coordinated, which indirectly indicates the group’s ability to gain a foothold outside its eastern redoubts. This decentralized approach and other tactical adjustments helped IS-K avoid crackdowns by Taliban security forces in early 2022.
In addition to focusing on easy targets such as defenseless Shia and Sufis, the group launched a series of operations against Afghanistan’s neighbors that were mostly symbolic.
In the spring of 2022, IS-K took responsibility for rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but these strikes did not appear to be aimed at causing military casualties. Rather, their goal was to undermine the Taliban’s credibility and the notion that only their government can ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan and prevent other terrorist groups fr om carrying out cross-border operations fr om its territory. This adaptation to a rapidly changing context has demonstrated the dexterity and resilience of IG-K.
Due to the intractable hostility between the group and the Taliban, the former are likely to continue to respond with aggression to external pressure, looking for new ways to undermine their opponent’s positions.
Analysing the problem from the inside, we come to the conclusion that the enmity between IS-K and the Taliban is rooted in a broader disagreement between Salafi and Deobandi, two movements that exist within Islam. IS-K accuses the Taliban of apostasy and polytheism, while the Taliban consider the Salafis to be Kharijites or extremist heretics.
One aspect of the ideological dispute is the different views on the world order: Daesh, or Islamic State (banned in the Russian Federation), whose regional subdivision is IS-K, seeks to destroy it, while the Taliban positions itself as a player in the system of nations.
Against this backdrop, attempts by IS-K to attract fighters from the Taliban have not been very successful so far, but the group will continue to do so, as it continues to enjoy strong financial and political support from its parent organization, and its members retain the ability to operate in the region beyond Afghanistan.
National Resistance Front
The militias, comprising mostly fighters associated with the previous regime, surpassed IS-K (banned in Russia) as the most active opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan in early 2022. Among them were many who fought the Taliban in the 1990s: former monarchists, members of the former pro-communist regime, and various mujahideen.
Prior to the start of the operation of the international coalition forces in 2001, most of these groups were on the losing side in the conflict with the Taliban. Now their ranks include representatives of the younger generation. The largest of these groups is the National Resistance Front (NRF), which is reportedly led by Ahmad Massoud from Tajikistan, the son of the well-known Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed by al-Qaeda militants (banned in the Russian Federation) on September 10, 2001.
The NRF is mainly active in the Panjshir province and adjacent areas in the north, including parts of the provinces of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa. It also has supporters in Kabul.
The opposition of the group to the Taliban began immediately after the takeover on August 15, 2021, when Panjshir remained the only province not controlled by them. A few days later, NRF insurgents in the Andarab district of Baghlan province repulsed the Taliban forces. The leadership of the movement quickly sent them to Andarab and Panjshir and established control over large settlements, but the outer areas were still swarming with rebels. Since then, the number of assaults by the NRF has been limited, but growing: by the beginning of the summer of 2022, there were more than a dozen attacks per week.
In Andarab, the NRF fighters have limited resources, so instead of openly confronting Taliban reinforcements, they usually withdraw to the mountainous areas, avoiding direct clashes. In Panjshir, the NRF militants keep hidden positions in the mountains, but so far have not been able to hold a single area.
The activities of the NRF in the provinces of Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa mainly consist of retreat attacks and regular ambushes at remote checkpoints, with less frequent killings of Taliban representatives, including with the use of improvised explosive devices.
Most armed opposition groups in Panjshir and surrounding areas nominally operate under the command of the NRF, although with little hierarchy or strategic coordination.
The leaders of the NRF are mostly located outside of Afghanistan. For this reason, local commanders often act independently, with little or no guidance from abroad. This flexible structure allows the National Resistance Front to absorb smaller formations that start to fight the Taliban amid local discontent.
The NRF’s message is focused on protecting the rights of ethnic minorities, with some senior members of the organization advocating a transfer of power to the provinces to ensure their greater independence from Kabul. The NRF does not specifically advocate a return to the old system of government, and its supporters sometimes disparage former Afghan leaders because they believe those let the Taliban to win.
Speaking to a foreign audience, the leadership of the National Resistance Front appeals to the ideas of freedom and self-determination, and incites fear of international terrorism. This rhetoric, which often reflects sincere opinion, is aimed at attracting regional and international support for the participants in the Afghan conflict who oppose the Taliban government. Senior NRF officials tell interlocutors abroad that their goal is to make the movement start negotiations, although perhaps not in the short term.
In dialogue with the Afghan audience, the NRF uses a slightly different message. Supporters of the NRF on social media focus on the grievances of the Tajiks, the largest ethnic group in northern Afghanistan, and monopolization of power in the country by the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in the country and the Taliban’s main constituency. These ideas have been an important part of Afghan domestic political discourse for decades.
Under previous governments, ethnic minority Afghan groups complained that the Pashtun-controlled government possessed too much power and was allegedly too close to fellow Pashtuns in the movement.
One aspect of the ideological dispute is the divergence of views on the world order: the Islamic State (banned in the Russian Federation), of which IS-K is a regional subdivision, seeks to destroy it, while the Taliban positions itself as a player in the system of nations.
Against this backdrop, attempts by IS-K to lure fighters from the Taliban appear to have met with little success so far, but the group will continue to do so, as it continues to enjoy strong financial and political support from its parent organization, and its members retain the ability to operate in the region beyond Afghanistan.
For now, reports like these, speculating on Afghan ethnic politics, seem to be limiting the NRF expansion beyond its northern strongholds.
However, the appeal of the NRF has been strengthened by the fact that its leadership has enlisted the support of the former chief of staff of the army General Qadam Shah Shahim. It is also important that the National Resistance Front provided safe haven for many of the previous government’s security personnel facing repressions from the Taliban.
The NRF also appears to be seeking to win over splinter factions of the Taliban, such as the group led by Mawlawi Mehdi, an ethnic Hazara commander who rebelled against his Taliban associates. However, it is not entirely clear whether this strategy will contribute to strengthening the ranks of the National Resistance Front in the foreseeable future.
Supreme Council of National Resistance
The newly formed anti-Taliban group, known as the Supreme National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan, includes leaders of many factions that rose to power in the 1980s and have been part of the Afghan government since 2001.
The group made itself known in May 2022, condemning the Taliban for abuse of power and authoritarian rule and calling for a peaceful resolution of disputes. The group has not claimed responsibility for any violent actions, but militants associated with Council member Atta Mohammad Noor, a northern warlord, have declared their intention to provide armed resistance to the Taliban in the Andarab region, as well as the provinces of Sari Pul, Samangan and Bamiyan.
The Council has a historical connection with the NRF. Previously, analysts had expected the organizations to join forces, but the merger did not happen. In any case, the membership of the NRF in the Council can be politically risky, since its leadership has lost credibility and suffered reputational losses after fleeing to Tajikistan.
Other rebel groups
After Taliban, a radical Islamist movement (banned in the Russian Federation) came to power, other groups associated with the previous pro-Western government emerged in Afghanistan.
In part, like the National Resistance Front, many of them had experience of confronting the Taliban even before the events of 2001. Others represent a younger cohort and are mostly made up of former members of the Afghan government security forces that have suppressed the Taliban in recent decades.
Some of these groups have not demonstrated great operational capability. Basically, their activities took place in social media and amounted to an exaggeration of the actual presence in individual regions of Afghanistan. Sometimes two or more groups claim responsibility for a single attack.
These disparate formations have so far failed to unite into a single insurgent movement fighting the Taliban. Moreover, acting on a common territory, they often compete for resources.
The most prominent of these small groups is the Afghan Freedom Front, led by former Chief of the General Staff General Mohammad Yassin Zia. Although this Front is less active than IS-K (banned in the Russian Federation) or the National Resistance Front, dozens of attacks have been attributed to it since the beginning of 2022. Its activities are mainly focused on the northern regions of Afghanistan, but go beyond them. The group is trying to lure fighters from the NRF, including in the Andarab region, and may succeed wh ere the NRF’s appeal is limited due to the majority of its members being ethnic Tajiks.
Thus, the potential connection of the Afghan Freedom Front with any historical or ethnic faction increases its chances of gaining broader popular support in the medium term.
The Islamic National Liberation Movement of Afghanistan, which made itself known in February 2022, also allegedly consists of members of the former security forces. The group claimed responsibility for almost two dozen attacks in the south and east of the country. Apparently, it consists mainly of Pashtuns and is concentrated in the southern regions of the territories controlled by the Taliban.
Other insurgent groups are still in their infancy and their presence on the battlefield is limited. These include the Afghan Liberation Front, the Freedom Corps Front, the Unknown Soldiers of Khazaristan, the Khazaristan Freedom and Democracy Front, the West Nuristan Front, and the South Turkestan Front.
Foreign militant groups
The conflict between the aforementioned groups and the Taliban has led to most of the outbreaks of violence in Afghanistan since August 2021, but a number of foreign militias may also pose an internal and external threat to the national security, despite the fact that they have not reported attacks since the Taliban came to power.
The presence of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul indicated a broader problem: in addition to the core of the terrorist organization and its local al-Qaeda (banned in Russia) in the Indian subcontinent, other foreign groups have limited presence in Afghanistan. These include Jamaat Ansarullah, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba (banned in the Russian Federation) and many formations of Uyghur militants. In addition, there are remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, banned in the Russian Federation) in the country, and they remain loyal to the Taliban and are under their control.
The largest external militant group is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, banned in Russia), which has thousands of militants and supporters in Afghanistan, although it is mainly composed of Pakistani extremists.
For now, these groups remain allied with the Taliban and appear to avoid any organized resistance to their rule. However, their very presence creates a security threat for the Taliban: if some foreign militant group went over to the side of the opposition forces, this could not only increase resistance in itself, but also undermine cohesion within the movement, wh ere fragmentation is already observed.
The Taliban government continues to routinely deny the presence of these fighters, even when their actions seem obvious. Privately, the Taliban say they are taking steps to lim it the independence of such groups and prevent them from joining the armed resistance.
Source: Middle East Institute
Against this background, other anti-Taliban groups associated with the previous government also emerged. Foreign terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (banned in the Russian Federation) are less active, but perhaps more dangerous to the security of Afghanistan. Presently they remain loyal to the Taliban, but under certain circumstances, they may rebel against the new government.
IS-K
In the months following the Taliban takeover, IS-K carried out more terrorist attacks in Afghanistan than ever before. The upsurge in violence appears to have been caused by two factors: the chaotic aftermath of a Taliban victory over Afghan government forces, which created a security vacuum in parts of the country’s east, and a change in IS-K tactics towards more frequent and localized attacks.
The tactical shift began earlier, between 2019 and 2020, when IS-K was under constant military pressure, responding with decentralization and establishment of underground networks with a focus on urban warfare.
Having lost ground in the rural areas, IS-K established itself in the cities with a flurry of raids and sniper attacks on Taliban forces after their victory. At first, the focus on subversion in urban areas worked, as the group operated in familiar terrain, recruiting educated, predominantly Salafi, people in cities like Kabul and Nangarhar. The fact that the Taliban had limited experience in dealing with extremist cells in urban areas was a big advantage for IS-K.
The mass escape of hundreds of imprisoned IS-K militants during the Taliban’s takeover also gave momentum and energy to its supporters. The fugitives reactivated the nets and launched a series of attacks on Taliban forces.
In late 2021, the Taliban began to gain the upper hand, launching a vicious counter-terrorism operation against IS-K in an urban area and forcing its fighters, whose attacks had been greatly reduced, to change tactics again. The group lost some of its operational capacity in eastern Nangarhar province, but continued to attack Taliban forces in the neighboring Kunar province, including occasional ambushes at isolated checkpoints using heavy weaponry.
In addition to its stronghold in the east, the group has expanded its geographic coverage with sporadic attacks in the south and west and more frequent attacks in northern Afghanistan. Instead of confronting the Taliban militarily, IS-K has primarily targeted Afghanistan’s Shia, Hazara and Sufi minorities, against whom it was opposed fr om the start.
Most of these attacks were fragmented, suggesting a limited presence of IS-K fighters in these areas. However, attacks in the north looked coordinated, which indirectly indicates the group’s ability to gain a foothold outside its eastern redoubts. This decentralized approach and other tactical adjustments helped IS-K avoid crackdowns by Taliban security forces in early 2022.
In addition to focusing on easy targets such as defenseless Shia and Sufis, the group launched a series of operations against Afghanistan’s neighbors that were mostly symbolic.
In the spring of 2022, IS-K took responsibility for rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but these strikes did not appear to be aimed at causing military casualties. Rather, their goal was to undermine the Taliban’s credibility and the notion that only their government can ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan and prevent other terrorist groups fr om carrying out cross-border operations fr om its territory. This adaptation to a rapidly changing context has demonstrated the dexterity and resilience of IG-K.
Due to the intractable hostility between the group and the Taliban, the former are likely to continue to respond with aggression to external pressure, looking for new ways to undermine their opponent’s positions.
Analysing the problem from the inside, we come to the conclusion that the enmity between IS-K and the Taliban is rooted in a broader disagreement between Salafi and Deobandi, two movements that exist within Islam. IS-K accuses the Taliban of apostasy and polytheism, while the Taliban consider the Salafis to be Kharijites or extremist heretics.
One aspect of the ideological dispute is the different views on the world order: Daesh, or Islamic State (banned in the Russian Federation), whose regional subdivision is IS-K, seeks to destroy it, while the Taliban positions itself as a player in the system of nations.
Against this backdrop, attempts by IS-K to attract fighters from the Taliban have not been very successful so far, but the group will continue to do so, as it continues to enjoy strong financial and political support from its parent organization, and its members retain the ability to operate in the region beyond Afghanistan.
National Resistance Front
The militias, comprising mostly fighters associated with the previous regime, surpassed IS-K (banned in Russia) as the most active opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan in early 2022. Among them were many who fought the Taliban in the 1990s: former monarchists, members of the former pro-communist regime, and various mujahideen.
Prior to the start of the operation of the international coalition forces in 2001, most of these groups were on the losing side in the conflict with the Taliban. Now their ranks include representatives of the younger generation. The largest of these groups is the National Resistance Front (NRF), which is reportedly led by Ahmad Massoud from Tajikistan, the son of the well-known Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed by al-Qaeda militants (banned in the Russian Federation) on September 10, 2001.
The NRF is mainly active in the Panjshir province and adjacent areas in the north, including parts of the provinces of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa. It also has supporters in Kabul.
The opposition of the group to the Taliban began immediately after the takeover on August 15, 2021, when Panjshir remained the only province not controlled by them. A few days later, NRF insurgents in the Andarab district of Baghlan province repulsed the Taliban forces. The leadership of the movement quickly sent them to Andarab and Panjshir and established control over large settlements, but the outer areas were still swarming with rebels. Since then, the number of assaults by the NRF has been limited, but growing: by the beginning of the summer of 2022, there were more than a dozen attacks per week.
In Andarab, the NRF fighters have limited resources, so instead of openly confronting Taliban reinforcements, they usually withdraw to the mountainous areas, avoiding direct clashes. In Panjshir, the NRF militants keep hidden positions in the mountains, but so far have not been able to hold a single area.
The activities of the NRF in the provinces of Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa mainly consist of retreat attacks and regular ambushes at remote checkpoints, with less frequent killings of Taliban representatives, including with the use of improvised explosive devices.
Most armed opposition groups in Panjshir and surrounding areas nominally operate under the command of the NRF, although with little hierarchy or strategic coordination.
The leaders of the NRF are mostly located outside of Afghanistan. For this reason, local commanders often act independently, with little or no guidance from abroad. This flexible structure allows the National Resistance Front to absorb smaller formations that start to fight the Taliban amid local discontent.
The NRF’s message is focused on protecting the rights of ethnic minorities, with some senior members of the organization advocating a transfer of power to the provinces to ensure their greater independence from Kabul. The NRF does not specifically advocate a return to the old system of government, and its supporters sometimes disparage former Afghan leaders because they believe those let the Taliban to win.
Speaking to a foreign audience, the leadership of the National Resistance Front appeals to the ideas of freedom and self-determination, and incites fear of international terrorism. This rhetoric, which often reflects sincere opinion, is aimed at attracting regional and international support for the participants in the Afghan conflict who oppose the Taliban government. Senior NRF officials tell interlocutors abroad that their goal is to make the movement start negotiations, although perhaps not in the short term.
In dialogue with the Afghan audience, the NRF uses a slightly different message. Supporters of the NRF on social media focus on the grievances of the Tajiks, the largest ethnic group in northern Afghanistan, and monopolization of power in the country by the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in the country and the Taliban’s main constituency. These ideas have been an important part of Afghan domestic political discourse for decades.
Under previous governments, ethnic minority Afghan groups complained that the Pashtun-controlled government possessed too much power and was allegedly too close to fellow Pashtuns in the movement.
One aspect of the ideological dispute is the divergence of views on the world order: the Islamic State (banned in the Russian Federation), of which IS-K is a regional subdivision, seeks to destroy it, while the Taliban positions itself as a player in the system of nations.
Against this backdrop, attempts by IS-K to lure fighters from the Taliban appear to have met with little success so far, but the group will continue to do so, as it continues to enjoy strong financial and political support from its parent organization, and its members retain the ability to operate in the region beyond Afghanistan.
For now, reports like these, speculating on Afghan ethnic politics, seem to be limiting the NRF expansion beyond its northern strongholds.
However, the appeal of the NRF has been strengthened by the fact that its leadership has enlisted the support of the former chief of staff of the army General Qadam Shah Shahim. It is also important that the National Resistance Front provided safe haven for many of the previous government’s security personnel facing repressions from the Taliban.
The NRF also appears to be seeking to win over splinter factions of the Taliban, such as the group led by Mawlawi Mehdi, an ethnic Hazara commander who rebelled against his Taliban associates. However, it is not entirely clear whether this strategy will contribute to strengthening the ranks of the National Resistance Front in the foreseeable future.
Supreme Council of National Resistance
The newly formed anti-Taliban group, known as the Supreme National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan, includes leaders of many factions that rose to power in the 1980s and have been part of the Afghan government since 2001.
The group made itself known in May 2022, condemning the Taliban for abuse of power and authoritarian rule and calling for a peaceful resolution of disputes. The group has not claimed responsibility for any violent actions, but militants associated with Council member Atta Mohammad Noor, a northern warlord, have declared their intention to provide armed resistance to the Taliban in the Andarab region, as well as the provinces of Sari Pul, Samangan and Bamiyan.
The Council has a historical connection with the NRF. Previously, analysts had expected the organizations to join forces, but the merger did not happen. In any case, the membership of the NRF in the Council can be politically risky, since its leadership has lost credibility and suffered reputational losses after fleeing to Tajikistan.
Other rebel groups
After Taliban, a radical Islamist movement (banned in the Russian Federation) came to power, other groups associated with the previous pro-Western government emerged in Afghanistan.
In part, like the National Resistance Front, many of them had experience of confronting the Taliban even before the events of 2001. Others represent a younger cohort and are mostly made up of former members of the Afghan government security forces that have suppressed the Taliban in recent decades.
Some of these groups have not demonstrated great operational capability. Basically, their activities took place in social media and amounted to an exaggeration of the actual presence in individual regions of Afghanistan. Sometimes two or more groups claim responsibility for a single attack.
These disparate formations have so far failed to unite into a single insurgent movement fighting the Taliban. Moreover, acting on a common territory, they often compete for resources.
The most prominent of these small groups is the Afghan Freedom Front, led by former Chief of the General Staff General Mohammad Yassin Zia. Although this Front is less active than IS-K (banned in the Russian Federation) or the National Resistance Front, dozens of attacks have been attributed to it since the beginning of 2022. Its activities are mainly focused on the northern regions of Afghanistan, but go beyond them. The group is trying to lure fighters from the NRF, including in the Andarab region, and may succeed wh ere the NRF’s appeal is limited due to the majority of its members being ethnic Tajiks.
Thus, the potential connection of the Afghan Freedom Front with any historical or ethnic faction increases its chances of gaining broader popular support in the medium term.
The Islamic National Liberation Movement of Afghanistan, which made itself known in February 2022, also allegedly consists of members of the former security forces. The group claimed responsibility for almost two dozen attacks in the south and east of the country. Apparently, it consists mainly of Pashtuns and is concentrated in the southern regions of the territories controlled by the Taliban.
Other insurgent groups are still in their infancy and their presence on the battlefield is limited. These include the Afghan Liberation Front, the Freedom Corps Front, the Unknown Soldiers of Khazaristan, the Khazaristan Freedom and Democracy Front, the West Nuristan Front, and the South Turkestan Front.
Foreign militant groups
The conflict between the aforementioned groups and the Taliban has led to most of the outbreaks of violence in Afghanistan since August 2021, but a number of foreign militias may also pose an internal and external threat to the national security, despite the fact that they have not reported attacks since the Taliban came to power.
The presence of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul indicated a broader problem: in addition to the core of the terrorist organization and its local al-Qaeda (banned in Russia) in the Indian subcontinent, other foreign groups have limited presence in Afghanistan. These include Jamaat Ansarullah, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba (banned in the Russian Federation) and many formations of Uyghur militants. In addition, there are remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, banned in the Russian Federation) in the country, and they remain loyal to the Taliban and are under their control.
The largest external militant group is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, banned in Russia), which has thousands of militants and supporters in Afghanistan, although it is mainly composed of Pakistani extremists.
For now, these groups remain allied with the Taliban and appear to avoid any organized resistance to their rule. However, their very presence creates a security threat for the Taliban: if some foreign militant group went over to the side of the opposition forces, this could not only increase resistance in itself, but also undermine cohesion within the movement, wh ere fragmentation is already observed.
The Taliban government continues to routinely deny the presence of these fighters, even when their actions seem obvious. Privately, the Taliban say they are taking steps to lim it the independence of such groups and prevent them from joining the armed resistance.
Source: Middle East Institute