UN analyzes the possibility of a merger between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Al-Qaeda
A recent report by the United Nations’ Security Council ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee highlighted the possibility of a merger between Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).
According to the report, the goal of the merger is to create an umbrella organization where various South Asian militant groups could hide or even cooperate, thus avoiding attempts by the Afghan Taliban to control them.
The Afghan-Pakistan border area hosts many paramilitary groups, which is why the extremist landscape in the region is complex, competitive and fast-paced, leading to new alliances and rivalry between different Islamist groups. Over the years, the cells operating in this territory have merged and split depending on geopolitical events. Therefore, a merger of two or more groups or cooperation within an umbrella coalition is more than possible in this situation.
However, the notion of a complete merger between the TTP and al-Qaeda is somewhat misleading. Conceptually, there is a difference between merging and creating an alliance of Islamist groups.
When merging, one group completely absorbs the other, as a result of which it ceases to exist as a separate independent organization. As a rule, smaller and weaker groups tends to integrate into larger and stronger groups for various reasons. The merging group disbands its command staff and other organs in order to fully integrate into the parent group. Similarly, it abandons its logo, rhetoric, funding sources, and strategic goals, merging entirely with a larger organization.
Alliance building is a process that includes many forms of cooperation such as strategic, ideological, tactical and transactional one. Ideological and strategic alliances are considered the highest forms of cooperation and in some cases also potentially lead to mergers. Tactical and transactional interaction between militant factions is considered low-level cooperation. In any case, regardless of the form of interaction, the groups participating in such joint events do not merge and retain their organizational independence.
Undoubtedly, Al-Qaeda is the oldest and most experienced of the Islamist terrorist organizations. In South Asia, it enjoys authority among all extremist formations with the exception of IS-Khorasan. Regional Islamist groups see al-Qaeda as the vanguard of extremism in the region. Today, however, Al-Qaeda is weak both operationally and organizationally. Its leadership depends on the Taliban for shelter, funding and logistics.
On the contrary, the TPP is now stronger than ever since it was created in December 2007. The group currently comprises between 12,000 and 15,000 fighters. Similarly, the TTP believes that its ideological doctrine of creating an Islamic emirate like Afghanistan in Pakistan is more likely to succeed if the group follows the Taliban model.
Thus, the TTP adjusted its organizational structure in line with the Taliban model, dividing Pakistan into northern and southern military zones, strengthening its presence in nine so-called wilayats (shadow provinces) and declaring seven so-called shadow ministries. In other words, as the TTP rose and grew in influence, al-Qaeda, on the contrary, went into the shadows. For this reason, it is difficult to talk about the prospect of a complete merger of the two groups.
Of the 38 extremist cells that have joined the TTP since July 2020, two belong to al-Qaeda's South Asian arm known as Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Cells under the command of Amjad Farooqi and Qari Mubin Jatt of AQIS were reported to have sworn allegiance to the TTP. It is noteworthy that the current leader of the group, Noor Wali Mehsud, called on AQIS to reconsider its regional agenda and move its focus to Pakistan.
The inclusion of Munib Jatt in the leadership of the TTP has enhanced the quality of its advocacy on social media. In its publications, AQIS actively supports the subversive activities and goals of the TTP. Thus, we see that, on the contrary, factions of AQIS are merging with the TTP, instead of the latter seeking inclusion in the core of al-Qaeda.
The way the extremist threat situation evolves in the region has several important implications for the security of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
First, having withstood the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and given the Taliban enough resources to consolidate their power in Afghanistan while remaining in the background, al-Qaeda is now interested in building other alliances on the ground, supporting organizations such as the TTP.
Secondly, there is an increase in the localization and regionalization of extremist ideology in the Afghan-Pakistani region. Although al-Qaeda has not abandoned global jihad, the group has other interests at the moment.
Third, the current situation also indicates a regrouping of several Islamist cells operating under the auspices of the Taliban and a blurring of local and regional ideological narratives.
As a result, the emerging landscape is likely to be more complex and unpredictable. Therefore, for a deep understanding of how the extremist threat is being transformed in the region, it is necessary to monitor the emergence of new alliances, as well as the merging and rivalry of various Islamist groups in the post-American period.