Duality of the Afghan Taliban's counter-terrorist policy and its consequences for the international community

Two years after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the emerging security situation is both optimistic and alarming.

On the one hand, throughout the entire period after the signing of the Doha Agreements, militants of the movement tried to eradicate cells of ISIS-Khorasan terrorist organization in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban leadership still denies the presence of al-Qaeda militants in the country, although this fact is obvious.

After two years in power, the Taliban have physically established their authority throughout Afghanistan. The movement does not currently face any challenge to its monopoly on power and appears to have had relative success in restoring order and reducing violence in the country.

Since August 2021, IS-Khorasan attacks have killed 1,095 people in Afghanistan. The Taliban's gaining full control of the country means that no group can operate from Afghanistan without their approval or support. Accordingly, the movement's complex relationship with other extremist groups is an factor vector in understanding how the Islamist threat is taking shape in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Regional experts and politicians have two opposing opinions on this issue.

Some say Afghanistan has become an “incubator” for paramilitary forces during the Taliban's two-year rule. In this regard, the most damning assessment came in the UN Monitoring Group's June report saying that the Taliban had failed to live up to its commitments under the Doha Agreement. Moreover, the report argues that the threat of terrorism is growing both in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole. According to a UN report, about 20 militant groups have great freedom of movement and action under Taliban rule, and they are actively taking advantage of it.  

The increasingly frequent attacks on Pakistan by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from Afghan hideouts are the clearest demonstration of how dubious the Taliban's commitment to the Doha Agreement is. Since the movement's return to power, militant violence in Pakistan has increased by 73%. The TPP has become a serious challenge in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations under the Taliban regime.

It is also alarming that not only TTP militants, but also some Afghan citizens have been found involved in terrorist attacks against Pakistan under the auspices of the TTP. This forced the Taliban to issue a religious decree warning citizens against participating in conflicts outside Afghanistan.

However, the Taliban denies the presence of the TTP, claiming that the group operates from Pakistan itself. Moreover, the movement's leadership dismissed the Pakistani government's assumptions, saying that Islamabad is not a party to the Doha Agreement, so the Taliban is not obliged to address Pakistan's security issues.

It should be noted that the leadership of the movement twice tried to mediate peace talks between the TTP and Pakistan, but the temporary truce did not lead to a political settlement due to intractable differences.

Similarly, despite the assassination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in central Kabul in July 2022, the Taliban continues to deny the presence of the terrorist organization's militants in Afghanistan. Ironically, the Taliban are still investigating the identity of the man killed in US drone strikes in Kabul.

To align itself with the Taliban, al-Qaeda also did not acknowledge al-Zawahiri's death. Despite Seif al-Adel overseeing affairs as its new de facto leader, al-Qaeda keeps silence on the killing of its former leader. It was reported that the Taliban's General Directorate of Intelligence is responsible for the security and surveillance of al-Qaeda leadership and the families of its members. According to unofficial information, the leadership of the movement advised Al-Qaeda to downplay the presence of its militants in Afghanistan and remain in a “sleeping” state.

The opposite and less popular view is that the Taliban have cooperated in containing the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, despite some issues and disagreements.

For example, US President Joe Biden said in July that the Taliban had kept their word. He said the following: “Do you remember what I said about Afghanistan? I said al Qaeda would not be there. I said it wouldn't be there. I said we'd get help from the Taliban. What's happening now? What's going on? Read your press. I was right. ".

Biden was referring to the Taliban's appeal to the United States for logistics and intelligence-sharing support in the fight against IS-Khorasan. The Taliban have ruthlessly suppressed the group, both physically and digitally. The movement’s militants killed several leaders of IS-Khorasan, including the organizer of a suicide bombing at Kabul airport in August 2021.

During the second year of Taliban rule, the number of terrorist attacks carried out by IS-Khorasan in Afghanistan fell by 83%. In contrast to the 231 attacks reported between August 2021 and August 2022, the group only carried out 41 attacks in the next similar period.

At the same time, the Taliban have become more active on IS-Khorasan's social media channels, especially the Telegram app, forcing the group to move to safer platforms, making its propaganda efforts more difficult. Although IS-Khorasan's social propaganda is reviving after a long period of calm, it is no longer as effective as it was in the first year of Taliban rule.

IS-Khorasan constantly denounces the Taliban, calling its militants puppets of the West and “apostates.” The purpose of such aggressive narrative is to undermine the ideological legitimacy of the movement. The Taliban, in turn, call members of IS-Khorasan “deviants.”

The Taliban's counter-narratives are spread out through the Al-Mirsaad news channel which produces materials in Dari, Pashto, Arabic and English. Al-Mirsaad regularly publishes books, notes and slogans aimed at ideologically discrediting IS-Khorasan.

And, of course, the Taliban has made every effort to crush IS-Khorasan, as this is the only terrorist organization to challenge the ideological legitimacy of the Taliban movement on its own soil.

Despite the Taliban's ruthless policies against IS-Khorasan, as of April 2023, there were 15 known terrorist plots by the group, nine of which were at a very advanced stage and were directed against Western embassies and consulates. Considering that the Taliban selectively cooperated with the United States in the counterterrorism area, the international community will have to calculate compromises in matters of interaction with the Taliban in the fight against common threats and the actual legitimization of the Islamic Emirate, or avoidance of cooperation and allowing the spread of the IS-Khorasan threat beyond limits of the region.