American experts' opinion on the stepping up of the activities of the Islamic State and its affiliates in various areas
As American security experts point out, the terrorist attack in Moscow carried out by the Russian-banned Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) at the Crocus City Hall concert hall on March 22 demonstrated intentions and capabilities that are increasingly troubling many in the anti-terrorism community.
ISKP is improving its capabilities across the board, from media operations to recruitment, financing and building an External Operations Planning Network (EXOPS). Retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, former CENTCOM head, most recently said that IS has a “strong desire” to attack the United States and warned that US officials must take the group's stated goal seriously.
The Taliban have had some success in limiting IS activities in Afghanistan, so the group has responded by focusing on carrying out attacks outside the country. Since early 2024, ISKP has launched high-profile attacks in Russia, Iran and Turkey. Numerous plots against Europe have been thwarted this year.
ISKP media operations have become more sophisticated over time, changing significantly since late 2021 after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.
Through the Al-Azaim Media Production Foundation, IS-Khorasan has centralized its messaging, increasing its threats against various countries both in the region and beyond. Al-Azaim's subject matter has expanded beyond purely religious topics to include discussions of social and political issues and grievances shared by IS supporters in various regions of the world. Al-Azaim produces videos in many languages and publishes magazines in Arabic, English, Farsi and Pashto. Al-Azaim has Tajik and Uzbek branches and aims to recruit Central Asians.
Online, ISKP used a number of social media and technology messaging platforms, including Archive.org, Element, Facebook, Hoop, and Telegram. ISKP has also used regional issues to attract new supporters. After IS missile strikes in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, ISKP launched a constant stream of propaganda praising the attacks and threatening more in the future.
For a group that has been forced to operate covertly, ISKP has demonstrated an impressive ability to synchronize its propaganda and physical operations, achieving a success in strategic communications that baffles most Western governments and militaries.
ISKP also seeks to diversify its funding sources, which include a variety of illegal revenue-generating schemes, including taxation, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, raising donations from IS supporters abroad, and smuggling of gems and timber.
As noted by terrorism finance expert Jessica Davis, ISKP’s income from taxation and extortion will vary depending on how much territory the group is able to control or influence.
Like other terrorist groups, IS-Khorasan has attempted to gain control of mining sites in order to profit from talc, chromite and other valuable commodities.
The United Nations said ISKP received funds through the Islamic State's al-Qarra branch in Somalia, which served as an intermediary and logistics hub in the organization's global network. This ability to transfer funds between different regional affiliates, despite intensive efforts by the United States and its allies to develop robust financing mechanisms to counter threats, demonstrates the Islamic State's penchant for innovation which allows them to adapt to constraints and opportunities as needed.
Compared to other Islamic State affiliates, ISKP appears to have cast a wide recruiting net, reaching out to fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus in an attempt to expand its ranks.
ISKP is courting supporters in Europe as well, as it works tirelessly to target individuals who may be inspired to carry out attacks in Germany, France, Sweden and other countries.
Discord leaks revealed that ISKP planned to attack “embassies, churches, business centers and the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament” when it was taking place in Qatar, and that it planned more than a dozen attacks by “developing a cost-effective model for external operations, which relies on resources from outside Afghanistan, operatives in target countries and extensive support networks.”
ISKP boasts hundreds of skilled operatives and a robust roster of battle-hardened fighters it can call on. About 5,000 fighters from Central Asia travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State at the height of its so-called caliphate, including about 1,500 from Uzbekistan, nearly 1,100 from Tajikistan and another 863 supporters from Kyrgyzstan.
A combination of factors has led to the resurgence of Islamic State affiliates around the world. In addition to the branches in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, there has recently been a sharp increase in the operational activities of IS militants in Syria.
As Syria watcher Charles Lister recently noted, there has been a rise in IS activity this year, with attacks increasing by 170% in Assad-held areas and by 30-40% monthly in northeastern Syria in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The al-Hawl camp in northeast Syria still holds about 44,000 people, with an estimated 93% being women and children, while additionally 9,000 IS fighters are held in detention centers in the same area.
The Islamic State's “Breaking Walls” campaign demonstrates that these camps and prisons remain the focus of IS militants and have been described as a “ticking time bomb.” Deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the camp and growing discontent among its residents could lead to further radicalization of al-Hawl population, especially the large number of youth.
The growing threat posed by the Islamic State and its affiliates comes at the same time that the United States and its allies are shifting material and human resources away from counterterrorism and toward competition with Russia and China, making the terrorist threat landscape more ominous, especially as IS and its affiliates continue to mobilize in response to geopolitical events.
Key conclusions
ISKP media operations have become more sophisticated over time, changing significantly since late 2021 after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.
ISKP is also seeking to diversify its financial sources, which include a variety of illegal revenue-generating schemes, including taxation, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, raising donations from Islamic State supporters abroad, and smuggling of gems and timber.
Compared to other Islamic State affiliates, ISKP appears to have cast a wide recruiting net, reaching out to fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus in an attempt to expand its ranks.
The terrorist attack carried out by ISKP on the Crocus City Hall concert hall on March 22 demonstrated intentions and capabilities that are of increasing concern to many in the counterterrorism community.